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Below replacement-level fertility in Iran: Progress and Prospects1 
 
Dr Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi 
 
 
Abstract 
In 1996, four provinces of Iran experienced below replacement level fertility. 
Since the early 1980s, these provinces have recorded lower fertility than the 
national level. How and under what condition has fertility declined to such a low 
level in these provinces?  It may be of considerable interest to examine whether 
these provinces can be regarded as the leaders of the fertility transition in Iran.  
What are the likely the effects of below-replacement fertility on population 
growth in Iran in the short term?  Will Iran, as a whole, experience below 
replacement fertility in the near future?  What would be the reaction of the 
government if below-replacement level fertility is reached in the near future? 
 
This paper will first, assess and analyse the fertility trends in the provinces of 
Isfahan, Gilan, Semnan and Tehran as compared with the national level during 
the period 1972-1996.  Using available data, an attempt will also be made to 
estimate recent fertility levels for these provinces.  Second, demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics, as well as contraceptive use, in these provinces 
will be reviewed; female singulate mean age at marriage and age-specific 
proportions married for 1976, 1986 and 1996 will then be examined.  Third, the 
prospects of low fertility in Iran as well as the likely reaction of the government 
on low fertility will be discussed thereafter.  
 
Introduction 
The onset of modest fertility decline in Iran appeared, mainly in urban areas, in 
the early1970. Fertility increased during 1976 to 1987, before the renewal of the 
family planning programme since 1988.  These changes coincide rather neatly 
with three political periods: the later stages of the Shah’s regime; the Islamic 
Revolution and the war against Iraq; and a subsequent period of renewed 
modernization and pragmatism.  There have also been shifts in population 
policy that took place over the same periods:  antinatalism and a government 
sponsored family planning programme in the later stages of the Shah’s regime; 
denunciation of family planning and encouragement of early marriage in the 
post-Revolutionary period; and a pragmatic return to antinatalism in the post-
1988 period (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2000).    
 
Fertility has declined dramatically since the adoption of a new population policy 
in 1988.  This sharp decline has occurred in most provinces and in both rural 
and urban areas.  Total fertility rate has sharply declined from around 6.3 in 
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of Health for providing the data necessary for this paper, and to Farzaneh Tajdini and 
Meimenat Hosseini for their assistance. 
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1986 to 2.6 in 1996 (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000a,b).  This spectacular fertility decline 
was greeted with incredulity by many overseas observers as well as some 
demographers inside Iran (see Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2000).  This was mainly 
based on international stereotypes by which Iran was being portrayed as a 
traditional society resistant to many aspects of social change.  Some also 
believed that the impact of the renewed family planning programme might not 
have appeared in such a short time period (Zanjani 1993; Mehryar et al. 2000).  
Nevertheless, studies have shown that the fertility transition has been underway 
since the mid-1980s (Ladier-Fouladi  1996, Aghajanian  1995; Aghajanian and 
Mehryar 1999).  The low level of fertility in Iran has been confirmed by the 
results of the Population Growth Estimation Survey (PGES) conducted by the 
Statistical Centre of Iran during 1998 (Statistical Centre of Iran 1999), as well as 
the Iran Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) carried out by the Ministry of 
Health in 2000 (Ministry of Health and Medical Education 2000). 
 
Some studies have recently addressed the fertility transition and noted the 
effect of population momentum and the second baby boom, which is expected 
to be observed in the coming decade (Saraie 1999; Leili-Nahari 1998).  
However, no research has been undertaken to study the prospects of very low 
fertility in Iran.  This paper is aimed at investigating the possibility of reaching 
below-replacement fertility in Iran.   If below-replacement fertility can be attained 
with only moderate socio-economic development within an Islamic context, the 
study of Iran’s experience may have some valuable lessons for future 
demographic changes in Islamic and other Asian countries with similar cultural 
backgrounds.  
 
Data  
The 1986 and 1996 Censuses are the main sources of data used in this study. 
Fertility levels and trends presented in this paper are based on the application 
of the own-children method to the 1986 and 1996 census files. The Statistical 
Centre of Iran (1999) conducted the Population Growth Estimation Survey 
during 1998-99 (ARJ 1377-78).  The survey was carried out in two phases.  The 
first phase took place during October 1998 and covered a sample of 566,571 
people.  The PGES divided the provinces of Iran into five regions with relatively 
similar measures of fertility and mortality. The first region includes those 
provinces with very low fertility and mortality while the fifth region consists of 
those provinces with very high level of fertility and mortality (and low level of 
socio-economic characteristics).   
 
The first Iranian Demographic and Health Survey was a national survey based 
on a representative sample of households throughout the country (Ministry of 
Health and Medical Education 2000). The sample included completed 
interviews for 1,14,000 households in 28 provinces and the city of Tehran, and, 
within these households, around 93000 ever-married women were interviewed.  
The survey covered around 4000 households in each province (2000 
households in rural and 2000 households in urban areas).  The Ministry of 
Health and Medical Education conducted the IDHS in collaboration with the 
Statistical Centre of Iran during November and October 2000.  
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Other data sources are also used in this paper to analyse the demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of the provinces under scrutiny.  Such data 
include published figures from the KAP surveys conducted by the Ministry of 
Health and Medical Education since 1987 as well as other case studies on the 
selected provinces. 
 
Quality of the data 
The own-children method is very sensitive to age reporting and its results may 
be biased if there are age misreporting in the data. Thus, it is important to 
assess the quality of age distribution before analyzing the results of the own-
children method. Figure 1 shows the age pyramid for Iran in the 1976, 1986 and 
1996 censuses. As shown in the figure, there were some signs of age heaping 
and digit preferences at the 1976 and 1986 censuses, but less so in the 1996 
census. In general, age reporting has improved from the 1976 to the 1996 
census. Because this study uses the 1986 and 1996 census, the following will 
only explain the age reporting on the two latter censuses. 
 
In 1986, the proportion of infants (children below one year of age, i.e. age 0) 
was lower than that of children age 1, 2, or 3. This may occur because of the 
tendency for under-reporting of children below age 2. One of the indicators for 
estimating the accuracy of the number of children below age 2 is to compare 
the survivors of these children who were aged 10 and 11 at the 1996 census. If 
the number of children below 2 were under-reported in the 1986 census, one 
would expect that the number of children aged 10 and 11 at the 1996 census to 
be higher than the numbers of children below 2 in the 1986 census. The 
survival ratio for children 10 years old at the 1996 census, who were 
presumably age 0 at the 1986 census, was around 0.93. This suggests that the 
reporting of children aged two or under in the 1986 census was not 
underreported.  
 
The lower number of children aged two or under may also be due to the fact 
that fertility began to decline two years before the 1986 census. In the 1996 
census, the number of children aged 10 and 11 are lower than those aged 12. 
This may suggest that the lower number of children aged under 2 had not been 
the result of under-enumeration, and may have instead been due to the fact that 
fertility decline began two years before the census. The preliminary result of the 
IDHS also shows that the proportion of children aged 16 is higher than those 
aged 15 and 14 (Figure 2). The decline of fertility before 1986 is consistent with 
the availability of family planning services since 1984. Mehryar et al. (1998) 
noted that despite the suspension of the official family planning programme, 
family planning services and supplies were available through public or private 
health sector. It is interesting to note that the number of family planning clients 
served began to increase in 1984 and 1985. The other finding of the age 
distribution in the IDHS is that the proportion of children aged 0 is higher than 
the proportions of children aged 1 and 2. Given the accuracy of age reporting at 
the IDHS, this may not be due to over reporting of children, but it rather may be 
because of the “baby boom” which has already begun. 
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Figure 1, Population pyramid for the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1976, 1986 and 
1996 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran, the 1976, 1986 and 1996 censuses.  
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Source: Ministry of Health and Medical Education, 2000. 
 
As indicated earlier, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education conducted the 
IDHS, in collaboration with the Statistical Centre of Iran.  The interviewers were 
selected among Health Officers (behvarz) who have been working in Health 
Houses (khanah-e Behdasht) for several years, and thus, were familiar with the 
field, and had an accurate knowledge and information about the households 
and respondents.  They were trained by the experts from both the Ministry of 
Health and the Statistical centre of Iran at different workshops held in each 
province.  Field supervisors from the two organizations were present in the field 
at the time of data collections to supervise the interviewers teams and to check 
the accuracy of the data.  The author visited two provinces of Kerman and West 
Azarbayjan at the time of data collection.  The quality of data collection was 
very high and impressive.   
 
The age distribution of females by province resembles the age distribution of 
males and females on the general features discussed earlier. As can be seen 
from the figure, there were lower tendencies for age heaping at the 1996 
census than in the 1986 for all provinces. The proportion of children aged 0 at 
the 1986 census was lower than those for children aged one and two in 1986 in 
all provinces, except Tehran. As mentioned earlier, the proportion of children 
aged 10 at the 1996 census was lower than those for ages 11 and 12. This also 
confirms that fertility actually started to decline in 1984 in these provinces. In 
general, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that age reporting in the 1996 census was 
considerably more accurate than the 1986 census, at both childhood and adult 
ages. The improvement in age reporting can be attributed to the rise of the level 
of education of respondents as well as to the fact that the interviewers 
registered the age according to respondents’ identity cards. This has 
contributed greatly to the accuracy of age reporting in the 1996 census.  
 
Figure 2. Population age distribution of Iran,  DHS, 2000
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Table 1. Myers’ index calculated for Iran and selected provinces, the 1986 
and 1996 censuses and DHS 2000 
 Census DHS 
Provinces 1986 1996 2000 
Iran 6.96 2.73 1.90 
Urban 4.57 2.30  
Rural 10.22 3.87  
    
Isfahan 4.43 1.85  
Gilan 3.97 1.84  
Semnan 7.04 2.30  
Tehran 3.90 2.31  
Note: Figures for Iran and urban and rural areas are for both sexes. Figures for 
provinces are based on the number of females only. 
Source: The 1986 and 1996 censuses, and IDHS 2000 
 
Table 1 shows the result of Myers’ index calculated for the 1986 and 1996 
censuses for Iran and selected provinces. The index calculated from the IDHS 
for Iran has also been provided. As can be seen, age reporting has improved 
over the last two decades. The Myers’ index for the age range 10 to 69 declined 
from 6.96 in 1986 to 2.73 in 1996, and to 1.90 in 2000. There was a slight 
tendency to report digits ending with 0 and 5 at the 1986 census. However, this 
tendency was very low at the 1996 census.  
 
The trend of sex ratio is another indicator of data quality. The sex ratio at birth is 
expected to be around 1.05 provided that the number of girls are not under-
reported or omitted. If there is a tendency for son preference in the society, the 
sex ratio at birth is expected to be higher than 1.05. The sex ratio at birth (for 
the age 0) at the 1986 and 1996 censuses was 1.03 and 1.06, respectively. The 
ratio for urban areas at the two censuses was 1.02 and 1.05 while those for 
rural areas were 1.05 and 1.06, respectively. This finding suggests that few 
births were omitted at the two censuses. The improvements in the census 
coverage and age reporting of the censuses have been documented by other 
studies (Leete et al. 1997; Mirzaie et al. 1996).  Mirzaie et al. (1996) examined 
age reporting in the 1986 census and 1990 National Sample Survey and 
concluded that age reporting in the 1986 census was much better than in the 
1976 and 1966 censuses. Keshtkar (2000) calculated the Wipple’s and Meyer’s 
indices for the 1996 census, and concluded that age heaping in the two sets of 
data was very low.  Mirzaie et al. (1996) and Abbasi-Shavazi (forthcoming) 
found signs of age misreporting in the census of such remote provinces as 
Sistan-Baluchistan, Kohgillyeh Booir Ahmad and Char Mahal Bakhtiari. But 
because this study focuses only on provinces with high level of socio-economic 
characteristics and particularly with the high level of education, the possibility of 
age misreporting in these provinces is low, and thus, the effects of age-
misreporting on the own-children fertility estimates is negligible. 
 
This paper does not claim that the age reporting in the 1986 and 1996 censuses 
is free from errors. But even with generous allowances for error, the application 
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of the own-children method to the censuses seems to be well justified. 
Nonetheless, own-children estimates of fertility based on the 1996 census may 
be more reliable than those from the 1986 census.  
 
 
Methodology 
The own-children method is used to estimate fertility trends and levels for Iran 
and the selected provicnes. The own-children method is one of the indirect 
techniques which uses the reverse-survival procedure to estimates fertility 
measures for the years previous to a census or household survey. Based on the 
information on a household record, the number of children under 15 are first 
identified and matched to women aged 15-64, assuming that these children are 
the births of the enumerated mothers. The matched children and mothers are 
then reverse survived to the 15 years preceeding the census or survey, to 
obtain the number of births and mothers for the years prior to the census.  Age-
specific fertility rates and total fertility rates are calculated by dividing the 
number of reverse-survived births by the number of reverse-survived women. 
The own-children fertility estimates are usually calculated for 15 years back to 
the census.  The reason for limiting the procedure to children under 15 is that 
younger children (under 15) are more likely to stay with their natural mothers 
than older children. Age-specific fertility rates are initially calculated for single 
years of age and time.  Estimates for grouped ages or calendar years are then 
obtained by dividing the aggregated numerators (births) by the aggregarted 
denominators (women). Such aggregation is useful in minimizing the distorting 
effects of age misreporting on the fertility estiamtes (Cho et al. 1986; Retherford 
and Thapa 1999). 
 
The own-children method was applied to the 1986 and 1996 censuses to 
estimate fertility. Abbasi-Shavazi (2000a) has given several reasons to justify 
the use of the own-children method in Iran. The reasons include the 
incompleteness of vital registration data and the improvement of the census 
data, particularly age reporting. Moreover, more than 95 per cent of children 
under 15 live with their natural mothers. Given the sharp fertility decline in Iran 
in recent years, unlike other indirect methods of fertility estimation, the own-
children method allows estimation of current fertility for years previous to a 
census and therefore, the fluctuation in fertility could be studied. 
 
The own-children estimates may suffer from some problems including age 
misreporting, under-reporting, migration, and mortality factors. Despite the 
modest age misreporting by single years, given that this study will estimate age-
specific fertility rates in five-year age groups, the effects of age reporting on the 
result will be minimal. Life tables are required for reverse-survival of children 
and mothers. Since appropriate life tables were not available for Iran and the 
selected provinces, this study used the West Model Life Tables according to the 
life expectancy for each province at the time of the census. To examine the 
effect of mortality level on the results, three different life expectancies for the 
years 1986, 1991 and 1996 were used with around 9 years difference. The 
result showed that using life expectancy of 59.0 for 1986 and 68.3 for 1996, 
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produced the TFR with only less than 2 per cent difference (Abbasi Shavazi 
Forthcoming). Furthermore, considering the effects of age reporting, mortality, 
migration and matching of children to their mothers on the own-children fertility 
estimates, Abbasi-Shavazi concluded that the method produced satisfactorily 
reliable results. 
 
Fertility trends and levels 
a) Fertility trends and levels at the national level 
Abbasi-Shavazi (2000a) analysed the single-year fluctuation of fertility trends 
over the period 1972-96.  He found that fertility transition in Iran has passed 
through different periods.  From 1972-1979, the fertility rate rose from 5.8 to 6.5.  
There was little evidence in the period of any impact on fertility of the family 
planning programme implemented by the Shah’s regime.  Following the 
Revolution, TFR was very high and constant during the period from 1980 to 
1984.  In this period, government policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
emphasised early marriage for young adults.  The revolutionary slogans were 
also supportive of the poor, and people had a rather positive attitude towards 
the new government subsidies on family expenditure.  Consequently, Iranian 
couples had every reason to marry early and have more children while married. 
 
In the period from 1985 to 1989, the high fertility regime created by the 
Revolution flattered and fertility started to decline.  TFR declined its peak in 
1984 to 6.2 in 1986 and further to around 5.3 in 1989.  The decline was, 
however, slow until 1989 before it accelerated during the 1990s.  Finally, in the 
period from 1990 onwards, the transition accelerated.  TFR fell sharply after 
1989 dropping from 5.32 in 1990 and further to 2.69 in 1996; a 50 per cent 
decline in six years. The Spectacular decline also occurred in both rural and 
urban areas. In rural areas of Iran, TFR dropped from 7.7 in 1986 to 2.9 in 
1996.  TFRs for urban areas declined from 5.4 to 2.03 in that period. The drop 
in fertility in urban areas, though sharp, was not as sharp as the decline in rural 
areas (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000a).   
 
b) Below-replacement level fertility provinces  
The own-children estimates of fertility showed that six provinces (East 
Azarbayjan, Isfahan, Gilan, Semnan, Mazandaran and Tehran) reached below 
replacement fertility in 1996. Total fertility fell below replacement level in urban 
areas of these provinces, although some rural areas still had a level of fertility 
above the replacement level. Question may arise whether these fertility 
estimates are accurate. In other words, is the low level of fertility in these 
provinces true, or is it because of underreporting of young children (i.e. age 0 or 
1).  As discussed earlier, studies have shown that the possibility of under-
reporting of children at the 1986 and 1996 census is minimal, and some have 
argued that due to the advantages of rationing system, children 0-4 may had 
been over-reported at the 1986 (Zanjani 1991).  Thus, it is reasonable to believe 
that the estimates are correct, and that the own-children estimate has drown a 
real picture of fertility level in the provinces under scrutiny. The other reason for 
the accuracy of the result is that these provinces have had high level of socio-
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economic characteristics and the level of education has been high, which all 
may have led to the accuracy of age reporting at the censuses.   
 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that to use fertility estimates for several 
years or a period (two, three or five year periods) instead of single-year 
estimates, to reduce the effects of misreporting or under-reporting of children 
(Cho, et al. 1986). The fertility estimates for the period 1994-96 would cancel 
out the effect of under-reporting on the result, if any.  For this reason, it was 
decided to examine the average of the TFRs for the period 1994-1996, and 
select the provinces with the replacement-level fertility or lower over the three-
year period.  Only four provinces of Isfahan, Gilan, Semnan and Tehran 
qualified (Table 2), and thus, this paper only focuses on these four provinces.   
 
Figure 3 compares the trends of TFRs for Iran and the selected provinces 
during 1972 and 1996.  As shown, the provinces followed similar trends as 
compared to the national level: a moderate decline in the early 1970s, a rise 
during 1979-84, a moderate decline during 1985-88 followed by a sharp decline 
after 1989.   
 
Fertility in all of the selected provinces has been lower than the total country 
since the early 1970s.  Tehran province displayed the lowest fertility among all 
other provinces, followed by Gilan, Semnan and Isfahan.  During 1972 and 
1976, Isfahan and Gilan had more or less similar fertility with the national level, 
but they revealed lower fertility than the national level thereafter.   
 
Tehran was the leader of fertility transition, as below-replacement level fertility 
was reached in Tehran in 1994 (2.16).  One year later, total fertility in Tehran 
was 1.95, and the other three provinces also joined Tehran and experienced 
below-replacement level fertility: Gilan had a TFR of 1.96, while Isfahan and 
Semnan revealed TFRs of 2.11 and 2.24, respectively.  By 1996, fertility in 
these provinces reached the lowest level as compared with other provinces as 
well as the national level: Tehran (1.79), Gilan (1.81), Isfahan (1.90) and 
Semnan (1.95). 
 
Considering the three-year period of 1994-96, total fertility rate in Tehran was 
the lowest (1.97) followed by Gilan (2.03), Isfahan (2.14), and Semnan (2.25).  
TFR for Iran was 2.92 over the same period (Table 2). 
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Source: Own-children estimates of TFRs from the 1986 and 1996 censuses, 
Statistical Centre of Iran 
 
Table 2, Trends of TFRs for Iran and the selected provinces, 1982-96 
Year Iran Gilan Isfahan Semnan Tehran 
1982 6.0985 5.3047 5.8766 5.3960 5.1449 
1983 6.2855 5.2027 5.9217 5.4703 5.0151 
1984 6.5502 5.4306 6.1608 5.8294 5.1653 
1985 6.3526 5.1253 5.9872 5.5614 4.9260 
1986 6.2323 4.9323 5.6989 5.5181 4.6395 
1987 5.7602 4.4286 5.0760 4.6651 4.2038 
1988 5.4876 4.0738 4.8173 4.6552 3.9217 
1989 5.2724 3.7152 4.6865 4.5401 3.7544 
1990 5.3273 3.7861 4.2907 4.0070 3.4539 
1991 4.9070 3.4765 3.7415 3.6821 3.0341 
1992 4.3304 3.1664 3.2236 3.2220 2.6975 
1993 3.8313 2.7408 2.7773 2.8864 2.3030 
1994 3.3873 2.3276 2.4094 2.5739 2.1652 
1995 2.8746 1.9666 2.1119 2.2417 1.9531 
1996 2.5216 1.8186 1.9088 1.9536 1.7972 
1994-96 2.9278 2.0376 2.1433 2.2564 1.9718 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran, Own-children data from the 1986 and 1996 
censuses. 
 
Table 3 shows total fertility rates for Iran as a whole, and the five regions 
included in the Population Growth Estimation Survey (PGES) in 1998 (see 
Figure 3. Own-children estimates of total fertility rates for women in provinces with very low fertility 
as compared with the national average, 1972 to 1996, Islamic Republic of Iran, 1986 and 1996 censuses
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footnote on Table 3 for the provinces included in each region). As can be seen, 
below replacement-level fertility in Iran was reached by 1998.  TFR for Iran was 
2.06, and that of urban areas was well below replacement level (1.88).  
However, fertility for rural areas (2.39) was still above the replacement level. 
 
Comparing different regions, regions 1 and 2 had experienced below-
replacement fertility in both rural and urban areas.  Region 3 also had below-
replacement level fertility.  Although TFR in rural areas of this region was 2.42, 
below-replacement level was reached in urban areas of this region (1.97).  
Regions 4 and 5 were the two regions that still had above replacement level 
fertility. Nevertheless, total fertility rate in these two regions was below or close 
to 3.  
 
Table 3, TFRs for different regions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1998 
Region 1 Total Urban Rural 
Iran 2.06 1.88 2.39 
    
Region 1 1.68 1.61 1.97 
Region 2 1.88 1.81 2.02 
Region 3 2.16 1.97 2.42 
Region 4 2.41 2.14 2.80 
Region 5 2.91 2.68 3.14 
Note: 1) Region 1 includes the provinces of Tehran and Gilan.  Region 2 includes the 
province of East Azarbayjan, Ghom, Isfahan, Mazandaran, Yazd, Markazi, 
Semnan and Golestan.  Provinces included in Region 3 were Kermanshah, 
West Azarbayjan, Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, Zanjan, Ardabil, Hamadan and 
Ghazvin.  Region 4 consists of Ilam, Chaharmahal Bakhtiari, Khozestan, 
Hormozgan, Lorestan and Booshehr provinces. Region 5 comprises of the 
provinces of Kordestan, Kohgilooyeh and Sistan and Baluchistan.  
Source:  Statistical Centre of Iran, 1999.  
 
c) Fertility by urban and rural areas 
As indicated earlier, below-replacement level fertility was reached in urban 
areas of Iran by 1996.  TFR in urban areas was 2.03 in 1996.  Although Tehran 
had the lowest level of fertility in Iran in 1996, the level of fertility in rural areas 
of Tehran (2.4) in 1996 was still higher than the replacement level.  The reason 
for the low fertility of Tehran as a whole is the low fertility in urban areas (1.7).  
The second reason is that around 80 per cent of the population were living in 
urban areas.  Fertility is rural areas of Semnan province was just around 
replacement level (2.2).  However, TFRs for Isfahan and Gilan provinces in both 
rural and urban areas reached below-replacement level by 1996.  It should be 
noted that below-replacement level fertility was also reached in urban areas of 
such provinces as East and West Azarbayjans, Mazandaran, Zajnjan, Markazi 
and Hamadan provinces by 1996.   
 
Table 3 indicates that by 1998, TFR in urban areas of Iran was just below 1.9 
while rural areas recorded a TFR of around 2.4.  Of the five regions included in 
the PGES, regions one to four experienced TFRs of below 2.2 in urban areas, 
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whereas only rural areas of regions one and two experienced below-
replacement fertility in 1998.   
 
 
d) Partial TFR for ages below and over 30 
Although, total fertility rate is useful to examine the level and trend of fertility 
over a period, it will not show the extent to which women have changed their 
fertility behaviour from one period to another. Thus, it would be interesting to 
analyse partial TFR for the ages below and over 30.  This will show the level of 
recuperation (making up) of fertility if women postponed their fertility during the 
periods.  
 
Table 4, Partial TFR for ages below and over 30 for Iran and selected 
provinces with low fertility, 1982-84, 1988-90 and 1994-96 
 Rural Urban 
Province 1982-84 1988-90 1994-96 1982-84 1988-90 1994-96 
 Sub-TFR Sub-TFR Sub-TFR Sub-TFR Sub-TFR Sub-TFR
Iran       
Below 30 4.07 3.5 1.97 3.41 2.56 1.49
  Over 30 3.24 3.23 1.5 2.33 1.88 0.78
     TFR 7.31 6.73 3.48 5.74 4.45 2.28
       
Isfahan       
Below 30 4.18 3.23 1.64 3.54 2.52 1.42
  Over 30 2.95 2.66 0.9 2.1 1.68 0.59
     TFR 7.13 5.89 2.54 5.64 4.2 2.01
Gilan       
Below 30 3.33 2.35 1.34 2.88 1.98 1.26
  Over 30 2.5 2.02 0.84 1.87 1.35 0.61
     TFR 5.83 4.37 2.18 4.75 3.33 1.87
Semnan       
Below 30 3.43 2.85 1.58 3.16 2.4 1.4
  Over 30 2.74 2.52 1.11 2.11 1.69 0.67
     TFR 6.17 5.37 2.69 5.27 4.09 2.07
Tehran       
Below 30 3.77 3.11 1.82 2.96 2.07 1.27
  Over 30 2.66 2.36 0.95 1.78 1.3 0.55
     TFR 6.43 5.47 2.77 4.74 3.37 1.82
Note: Because the data files for each province was different from the file for 
urban and rural areas, figures presented in this paper are slightly 
different from the figures in Table 2.  
Source: The 1986 and 1996 censuses 
 
Table 4 shows partial TFR for ages below and above 30 in rural and urban 
areas for the periods of 1982-84, 1988-90 and 1994-96.  It should be 
mentioned, however, that the figures provided in this paper are cross-sectional, 
and thus, do not show the experience of real cohorts of women.  As shown, 
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more than 50 per cent of fertility of women in both rural and urban areas 
occurred at ages below 30 during the three periods.  For example, around 56 
per cent of fertility for Iranian women in rural areas occurred at ages below 30 
during the period 1982-84, while only 44 per cent occurred at ages above 30.  
The corresponding figures for women in urban areas at the same period were 
around 60 and 40.  During 1988-90, the percentage of fertility occurring at ages 
below 30 for women in rural areas declined to 52, indicating that fertility was 
mainly controlled or postponed at these ages.  The percentage of partial TFR 
for ages above 30 increased to around 48 over the same period.  Partial TFR 
for women at both ages below and above 30 declined further during the period 
1994-96.  However, the percentages of fertility occurred at ages below 30 at 
both rural and urban areas increased by 1994-96.  This decline may have 
occurred because older women controlled their fertility after age 30.  This is 
consistent with family planning programme implemented after the 1988 by 
which couples were encouraged to limit their childbearing between their 20s 
and 30s.  Given that most Iranian women would like to have at least two 
children, it is expected that not all women control their fertility before age 30, but 
they are more likely to limit their childbearing after age 30.  The pattern of sub-
TFR for the selected provinces resembles the pattern of the national level. 
 
The low fertility that has been observed may be temporary. It is clear in Iran that 
fertility has fallen simultaneously at all ages. At the older ages (i.e. 30+), women 
have already had high fertility in the past, so their present low fertility can be 
seen as a response to past high fertility. However, women at younger ages are 
starting out on a new fertility regime with much lower fertility in their 20s. It is 
possible that those now experiencing low fertility in their 20s will, in their thirties, 
have higher fertility than women who are now in their thirties. If this happens, 
there would be tendency for the TFR to rise over time.  A cohort analysis is 
needed to deal with this issue.  
 
e) Average age of women at childbearing 
Table 5 also shows average age of childbearing for Iranian women and the 
selected provinces for 1976, 1986 and 1996.  The result of this table is 
consistent with the findings of Table 3.   
 
Table 5, Average age of women at childbearing for Iran and selected 
provinces, 1976, 1986 and 1996 
Province 1976 1986 1996
    
Iran 28.9 29.5 28.5
  
Isfahan 28.2 28.7 27.2
Gilan 29.2 29.9 28.1
Semnan 28.8 29.4 27.7
Tehran 27.9 28.4 27.3
Source: The 1986 and 1996 censuses 
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Average age of women at childbearing for Iranian women increased from 28.9 
in 1976 to 29.5 in 1986, but declined to 28.5 in 1996.  The pattern for women in 
the selected provinces is again similar to that of the national level.  As 
mentioned earlier, the reason for the increase and subsequent decrease in 
average age of childbearing is that after the revolution due to the relaxation of 
family planning programme and the implementation of pronatalist policies, 
fertility increased and also the period of childbearing continued until older ages.  
This contributed to the rise of average age of women at childbearing. However, 
due to the re-introduction of family planning programme and the encouragement 
of the programme to bear children between ages 20s and 30s, women 
controlled their fertility after age 30, and thus, the mean age at childbearing 
declined in 1996.  Results of KAP surveys conducted by the Ministry of Health 
and Medical Education show that women who used family planning services, 
particularly tubectomy, in recent years, were mainly those aged 35 and above 
with more than three children.  
 
f) ASFRs for selected provinces  
Further light can be shed on the nature of fertility in these provinces through 
examination of changes in age specific fertility rates.  Figure 4 shows ASFRs for 
Iran for the three periods 1972-74, 1984-86 and 1994-96.    
 
Source: Statistics Centre of Iran, Own-children Data from the 1986 and 1996 
censuses. 
 
Between 1972-74 and the peak of fertility in 1984-86, fertility rates rose by 
roughly equal proportions in every age group (except 15-19).  Then between 
1984-86 and 1994-96, the rates fell substantially in every age group. All 
Figure 4. ASFRs for women in  the selected provinces as compared with the national level, 1972-74, 1984-86 and 1994-96
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provinces experienced more-or-less similar pattern of fertility to the national 
level.  The very substantial falls in fertility in the middle, peak ages of 
childbearing provide the explanation of why the fall in fertility in Iran from 1984 
to 1996 was faster than any other recorded case.  The steep fertility decline in 
all age groups suggests that starting, spacing and stopping of childbearing all 
occurred at the same time.  That is, young couples started their childbearing 
later, married women were spacing their births and older women stopped their 
childbearing simultaneously.   This cross-sectional effect may have been a 
compensation for the very high fertility at all ages before 1986 (Abbasi-Shavazi 
et al. 2000). 
 
 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the selected 
provinces 
 
The sharp fertility decline and the attainment of below replacement fertility in the 
selected provinces of Iran have already been described.  The main question on 
how such low level of fertility was reached in these provinces remained 
unanswered.  Due to lack of sufficient data, it is not possible to explain the 
pathway by which fertility declined to such a low level in Iran and particularly in 
the selected provinces.  The explanation of below-replacement level fertility is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, some selected socio-economic of 
the provinces under scrutiny are presented in this section.  Nuptialtiy and 
marriage pattern of the population for Iran and the selected provinces will be 
discussed first; women status and their educational and economic 
characteristics will be presented thereafter.  The reason for the presentation of 
these figures is the importance of marriage pattern as well as the status of 
women on the low level of fertility in advanced countries with below-
replacement level fertility (United Nations Population Division 2000; McDonald 
2000).  
 
Nuptiality change   
Studies have shown that fertility transition in advanced countries with low fertility 
has mainly occurred because of the change in nuptiality pattern; a reduction of 
the proportion of married people at ages 15-19 and 20-24, and consequently an 
increase in age at marriage (Yushiro 1998; Ueno 1998). Table 6 describes 
female singulate age at marriage and age-specific proportion ever married for 
Iran and the selected provinces for the years 1976, 1986 and 1996.  
 
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has encouraged early marriages 
since the 1979 Revolution.  Young couples received many incentives for early 
marriages.  Minimum legal age at marriage has also decreased from sixteen to 
nine after the revolution. Despite these changes, female singulate age at 
marriage did not change very much during 1976-1986, but increased 
considerably during 1986-1996.  As shown, female singulate age at marriage 
increased from 19.52 in 1976 to 19.73, and then increased by around 2 years.  
Proportion ever married at ages 15-19 has also declined from 34 per cent in 
1986 to 18 per cent in 1996.  Despite the decline of the proportion ever married 
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at ages 15-24, universality remains one of the main characteristics of the 
Iranian marriage pattern (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000b).  
 
Table 6, Female singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) and age-specific 
proportion married, 1976 to 1996, Iran by province 
Age/Year  Province 
 Iran Isfahan Gilan Semnan Tehran 
1976      
SMAM 19.52 18.86 21.21 20.45 18.70 
15-19 0.343 0.435 0.197 0.254 0.384 
20-24 0.786 0.840 0.675 0.728 0.748 
25-29 0.932 0.952 0.906 0.928 0.900 
1986      
SMAM 19.73 19.23 21.48 20.37 20.55 
15-19 0.335 0.425 0.296 0.327 0.344 
20-24 0.796 0.799 0.594 0.722 0.724 
25-29 0.906 0.931 0.861 0.724 0.837 
1996      
SMAM 22.09 21.32 23.41 22.21 22.13 
15-19 0.140 0.212 0.140 0.176 0.169 
20-24 0.607 0.672 0.512 0.603 0.613 
25-29 0.852 0.895 0.781 0.855 0.851 
Sources: Abbasi-Shavazi (2000b).  
 
Family planning 
Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald (2000) argued that after 1965, fertility fell 
widely in the Third World at least partly because there were new and better 
methods of fertility control available, and because the ‘population explosion’ 
debate had increasingly legitimised birth control. The decline of fertility in Iran 
has partly been due to the implementation of family planning programmes after 
1988. The rise of education, and the high level of prosperity had all created a 
demand for family planning services, and by the means of the legitimacy and 
availability of family planning services, contraceptive prevalence rate has risen, 
and thus, fertility declined considerably.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the first national family planning programme in Iran stated 
in 1967.  After a decade, contraceptive prevalence rate increased to 37 per 
cent.  The programme was mainly urban oriented, and by 1976, only 20 per 
cent of rural women were using contraceptives.  Contraceptive prevalence rate 
for urban areas in 1976 was 54 per cent.  The family planning programme was 
suspended after the revolution, and pronatalist policies were implemented.  
Young couples were encouraged to marry earlier, and married couples were 
given incentives to bring more children while married (Mehryar et. al. 2000).  
Due to the relaxation of family planning programmes, and the implementation of 
pronatalist policies, the population of Iran increased by 3.9 per cent during 1976 
and 1986.  After a decade, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
reversed its population policies and took an active role in implementing 
antinatalist policies.  As shown in Table 7, contraceptive prevalence rate 
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increased from 49 per cent in 1989 to 65 per cent in 1992, and further to 73 per 
cent in 1997.  The gap between rural and urban areas narrowed over this 
period.   
 
An indication of the success of family planning programme after the revolution is 
the high percentage of modern contraceptive use in rural areas.  In 1997, the 
percentage of rural women aged 15-49, who were using modern methods of 
contraception, was higher than that for women in urban areas (Table 6). For 
example, around 57 per cent of women in rural areas of Iran were using modern 
methods as compared with only 46 per cent of women in urban areas.  The 
figures for the provinces in both urban and areas, except for urban areas in 
Semnan province, were higher than those for the national level.  
 
Table 7. Percentage of women aged 15-49 years using different methods 
of contraception, by province, 1997 
Province Rural Urban 
 Modern Traditional Total Modern Traditional Total 
IRAN 56.6 8.5 65.9 45.8 22.1 77.4 
       
Gilan 59.2 14.4 74.0 57.7 23.7 81.4 
Isfahan 59.8 17.7 77.5 53.8 27.8 81.7 
Semnan 56.8 17.2 74.0 46.6 25.9 72.5 
Tehran 59.4 20.6 80.2 50.8 29.7 80.8 
Source: MOHME, 1998 (annual Conference on Population and Family 
Planning, Tehran. 
 
Relative effects of marriage and family planning on fertility decline 
As mentioned earlier, studies have shown (Chesnais 1998; Ueno 1998; Yushiro 
1998) that below replacement fertility was reached in many advanced countries 
due to nuptiality change and the rise of the proportion of women never married.  
Yushiro (1998) stated that the continuous dip in the birth rate over the last two 
decades has been a result of the tendency among young people not to marry, 
which has been a major reason for fewer births in Japan.  However, this is not 
the case for Iran as most women marry before age 30.  Abbasi-Shavazi (2000b) 
has decomposed the changes in total fertility rate from 1976 to 1996 into the 
components of changes in nuptiality and marital fertility for Iran by province 
(Table 8).  He found that most of the fall during 1986 and 1996 was due to the 
decline in marital fertility.  Around 86 per cent of the fertility decline was due to 
the change in marital fertility and only 24 per cent to nuptiality change.  The 
decomposition of the change in TFR for provinces was identical to that of the 
total population.  
 
Abbasi-Shavazi concluded that family planning might have had a major role in 
the reduction of fertility in recent years.  Nevertheless, it is not clear how and 
under what condition fertility has been controlled within marriage. 
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Table 8. Changes in adjusted TFR and the effects of components changes 
for the periods, 1976-86 and 1986-96, Iran by province 
 1976-86 1986-96 
 Change 
in:  
Attributable to: Change 
in: 
Attributable to: 
Province TFR Marriage Marital 
fertility 
TFR Marriage Marital 
fertility 
Iran 0.15 -0.20 0.35 -3.70 -0.52 -3.20 
       
Gilan -0.79 -0.04 -0.75 -2.84 -0.50 -2.34 
Isfahan -0.10 -0.15 0.05 -3.68 -0.55 -3.13 
Semnan 0.58 0.07 0.51 -3.06 -0.50 -2.56 
Tehran 0.58 -0.19 0.78 -2.71 -0.38 -2.33 
Sources: see Table 4. 
 
Status of women in Iran and the selected provinces 
 
A: Literacy rate and education 
Table 9 shows literacy rate for population 6 years and above for Iran and 
selected provinces by sex in 1986 and 1996.  There was a noticeable gap 
between male and female literacy rate in 1986 in Iran and the selected 
provinces, except in Tehran where female literacy was slightly higher than that 
of males.  By 1996, the literacy rate for both males and females increased and 
the gap between the literacy of male and females has narrowed.   
 
Table 9. Literacy rate for population 6 years and above for Iran and 
selected provinces with low fertility, 1986 and 1996 (%) 
Province 1986 1996 
 Male Female Male Female 
Iran 71.0 52.1 84.7 74.2 
     
Isfahan 78.5 62.7 88.3 80.9 
Gilan 73.9 58.0 83.9 74.6 
Semnan 77.5 63.2 88.0 80.8 
Tehran 77.7 78.4 91.0 85.0 
Source: Beladi-Musavi, 1997. 
 
For example, literacy rate for males increased from 71 in 1986 to around 85 in 
1996, while those for females increased from 52 to 74, respectively.  Literacy 
rate for males in the provinces were lower than 80 per cent, but the figures 
increased to level above 80 per cent in the three provinces of Isfahan (88 per 
cent), Gilan (84 per cent) and Semnan (88 per cent).  Literacy rate for Tehran 
was 91 per cent, the highest level among other provinces, in 1996.  The 
increase in the literacy rate for females during 1986 and 1996 was much higher 
than that for males.  Female literacy rate for the provinces, except for Gilan, 
was considerably higher than that of the total country.  
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Attainment of female students at high school and higher education also 
increased during the same period. In 1986, around 10 per cent of Iranian female 
students were attending high school and only 1.2 per cent attended higher 
education (Table 10). By 1996, the figures increased to 19.3 and 4.3 per cent, 
respectively.  The attainment of female student in the selected provinces 
doubled or tripled over the same period.  For example, in 1986, only 1.2 per 
cent of female students were attending higher education as compared with 4.3 
per cent in 1996.  The percentage of female students attending higher 
education in Gilan (0.5 per cent), in 1996, was around eight times higher than 
that of those in 1986 (4.1).  The equivalent figures for the provinces of Semnan, 
Isfahan and Tehran were six times, five times and around three times, 
respectively, higher than those of 1986.   
 
 Table 10. Attainment of female students at the high school and higher 
education for Iran and selected provinces, 1986 and 1996 (%) 
Province 1986  1996  
 High school Higher 
education 
High school Higher 
education 
Iran 9.9 1.2 19.3 4.3 
     
Isfahan 9.3 1.2 20.6 6.1 
Gilan 12.9 0.5 23.1 4.1 
Semnan 11.2 1.2 21.9 7.1 
Tehran 14.4 2.7 23.4 7.7 
Source: As Table 7.  
 
The increase in the level of education for female and their participation in higher 
education may all have had direct and indirect effect on fertility decline over the 
period 1986 and 1996.  Given that the level of female education in all of these 
provinces has been higher than that of the national level, it is not surprising that 
they all have reached below-replacement fertility.   
 
B: Labour force participation rate 
Yushiro (1998132-133) noted that the increasing number of Japanese women 
who marry later in life was closely associated with the rise in the rate of 
employment and the improvement of their economic status.  Moreover, the rate 
of women advancing to four-year universities has increased, and the gap 
between male and female students has narrowed.  Yushiro concluded that ‘if 
the present trend continues, a “lower fertility cycle” would emerge; less children 
– permitting girls to advance to higher education – higher women’s employment 
rates – later marriages – low fertility rates’.  Although, the level of education in 
Iran has increased in recent years, female economic activities and their labour 
force participation rate have not changed considerably.  
 
Crude activity rate for females peaked in 1976 (12.93), increasing from 9.2 in 
1956 to 12.93 in 1976.  This was due to development policies implemented by 
previous regime during the 1960 and early 1970s.The figure declined to its 
lowest level in 1986 (7.15), and then slightly moved upward to 8.5 in 1991 and 
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to 9.1 in 1996.  Nevertheless, the level of activity rate for females was still lower 
than the figure in 1956.   
 
There appeared different patterns of activity rate for females in the selected 
provinces. In 1986, female crude activity rate in Gilan was considerably higher 
than that of Iran as a whole and other provinces.  Isfahan and Tehran also had 
higher activity rate than the national level.  In 1996, the provinces of Tehran and 
Gilan experienced a decline in activity rate as compared with the 1986, but the 
there was an increase in the activity rate for Isfahan and Semnan.   
 
Yashiro (1998:129) found that a major cause of the continuous decline in fertility 
in Japan was the increasing participation of women in the labour force.  This, in 
turn, has increased the opportunity costs of having children for a family.  This is 
a common phenomenon in industrialized countries.  Caldwell, Caldwell and 
McDonald (2000) believed that most explanations for very low fertility centre on 
the mass employment of married women with children, an explanation that must 
be tempered by noting that mothers were flooding into the job market in most 
Western countries well back into the baby boom years of the 1950s and 1960s.  
They noted that ‘some explanations emphasize that full-time employment, 
based on preceding lengthy education, gives women an alternative role to that 
of mother and even wife’.   
 
As discussed earlier, female labour force participation rate in Iran is not high 
and thus, unlike Japan and other advanced countries, opportunity costs for 
having children for married couples is not high.  Thus, it is reasonable to argue 
that the rise education and increasing level of expectations have been the major 
causes of fertility decline, but not female activity rate.  McDonald (2000a,b) 
argued that if females are provided with high level of gender equity in the family, 
they could contribute to family decision-making, and thus, fertility will decrease 
to low level. Given the rise of the level of female education, although women are 
enjoying higher status within family, and this may partially have contributed to 
fertility decline in Iran. 
 
 
Discussion 
This paper aimed at examining the fertility level in the selected provinces that 
experienced below-replacement fertility by the mid 1990s.  The validity of fertility 
measures was assessed through the evaluation of age reporting at the 1986 
and 1996 censuses. Age reporting has improved from the 1986 to the 1996.  
This has justified the application of the own-children method to the two 
censuses.  Total fertility rate and age-specific fertility rate for Iran and the 
selected provinces were presented for the period of 1972 and 1996.  The 
results showed that the provinces of Gilan, Isfahan, Semnan and Tehran have 
had lower fertility than the national level since the 1970s, and reached below-
replacement level fertility over the period 1994-96.  The estimates were 
confirmed by the findings of the 1998 Population Growth Estimation Survey.    
In 1998, TFR for Iran as a whole was 2.06, while that of urban areas was 1.88. 
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Of five regions included in the survey, three had reached a TFR of below 2, 
while the other two had fertility rate close to below replacement level.   
 
How and under what conditions such low level of fertility was attained in these 
provinces.  As shown, all the provinces under scrutiny have enjoyed higher 
socio-economic characteristics than the national level and other provinces.  
Literacy rate for has improved during the same period.  The attainments of 
females at high school as well as higher education in the provinces were higher 
than those for Iran as a whole.  Female singulate mean age at marriage in 
these provinces was higher than that of the national level during 1986 and 
1996.  Contraceptive prevalence rate also increased in these provinces. Given 
their higher level of development, it is not surprising these provinces have been 
the leaders of fertility transition in reaching below-replacement fertility before all 
other provinces.  
 
Will Iran, as a whole, experience below-replacement fertility in the near future?  
Given the sharp decline in fertility of other provinces since the late 1980s, it is 
expected that other provinces attain below-replacement fertility as their socio-
economic status progress.  Abbasi-Shavazi (2000a) has found that all provinces 
and rural and urban areas of Iran have experienced sharp fertility decline over 
the last decade.  Therefore, it can be argued that other provinces may reach 
below-replacement fertility even if their socio-economic characteristics do not 
become similar to the national level.  This is in line with the argument made by 
Wilson (2001), which ‘demographic convergence’ has (or soon will be) occurred 
independent of ‘economic convergence’.  Hirschman, et al. (199?) observed 
that in Thailand ‘the diffusion of low fertility behaviour had raced ahead of the 
structural determinants of fertility behaviour’. This has already been confirmed 
by the results of the PGES in Iran.   
 
Will Iran or the selected provinces experience an increase in their fertility in the 
future?  As Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald (2000) noted, ‘some people 
believe that lower fertility is simply a reaction to bad times after the end of the 
high-employment, rapid growth period stretching through the 1950s and 1960s’.  
This is also true for Iran, as some believe that economic hardship will be over 
within a certain number of years and then people will compensate their low 
fertility.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the low fertility that has been observed may be temporary. 
Fertility has fallen simultaneously at all ages. The low fertility of the older 
women may have been a response to past high fertility. However, it is possible 
that those now experiencing low fertility in their 20s will, in their thirties, have 
higher fertility than women who are now in their thirties. If this happens, there 
would be tendency for the TFR to rise over time.  Given the high level of 
education and the change of values for young generation, it is unlikely that 
couples change their fertility behaviour in the future.  The result of the KAP 
survey conducted by the Ministry of Health and Medical Education has shown 
that around 25 per cent of pregnancies were unwanted.  The result of unwanted 
pregnancies by parity also showed that the majority of those with four children 
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or more had reported that their pregnancies were unwanted.  The number of 
ideal family size has also declined very much.   
 
The main question here is the extent to which this low fertility affects the 
population growth rate in the coming decade.  Saraie (2000) and Leili Nahari 
(1999) examined the effect of the young structure of population on population 
growth rate.  They projected the size of the population for the next twenty years 
if the country will immediately reach below replacement fertility and remain 
stable until by 2021.  The result has shown that the population would increase 
by around 25,000,000 before it starts to decline.  Thus, due to the effects of 
"echo" of the earlier baby boom, the results of low fertility will not come to the 
effect within the coming decade, and the population of the country would 
continue to increase for some time. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
population of the low-fertility provinces comprise around one third of the total 
population of Iran.  Thus, even some remote provinces may not join the leaders 
of fertility transition in reaching below-replacement fertility in the near future, 
because of the smaller proportion of their populations; their contribution to the 
total population would not be as large as the low fertility provinces.  In other 
words, the effect of low fertility provinces on fertility at the national level will be 
substantial, and further fertility decline in these provinces will lead to lower 
fertility in Iran. 
 
What would be the reaction of the government on below-replacement fertility in 
Iran?  Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald (2000) noted that low level of fertility in 
some developing countries has caused surprisingly little reaction outside 
academic circles. They stated that one reason for the slow government 
reactions is “population momentum; the fact that age structures are still 
adjusting to the relatively new low fertility levels and in most cases will not fully 
adjust for decades”. Given that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
faced with the prospects of “post-revolutionary baby boom”, no official policies is 
expected to be implemented with regard to low fertility in Iran.  All the efforts are 
concentrated on the improvement of health, the expansion of reproductive 
health services, as well as the reduction of fertility in rural areas and the 
provinces with high fertility (UNFPA 1999, 2000).  This will undoubtedly lead to 
low fertility in all provinces of Iran in the future.   
 
The other reason why low fertility may not attract due attention in the near future 
is the fact that not all provinces have experienced below-replacement fertility.  
Some provinces, particularly in rural areas, still have higher fertility than the 
national level.  Besides, some government officials and experts believe that this 
low level of fertility is mainly due to recent economic hardship, and thus fertility 
may rise again after this economic hardship in over. The importance of low 
fertility and its negative impacts on population growth rate not only has not 
attracted policy makers in developing countries, but also some planners in 
advanced countries, where below-replacement fertility had been reached since 
the 1980s, are not convinced about the effects of such low fertility yet (United 
Nations Population Division 2000).  Furthermore, funding agencies such as the 
UNFPA and the World Bank also support the programmes to reduce fertility.   
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Therefore, due to the age structure of the population, unlike some other Asian 
countries as observed by Freedman (Freedman 1995: 23), the issue of rising 
fertility in Iran may not be an important population issue in Iran at least within 
the next decade.  Indeed, given that Iran is about to get a new "echo" baby 
boom, further reductions in fertility would be needed to keep the number of 
births at the present level. In fact, trying to achieve a stable annual number of 
births is probably a more useful policy target than replacement-level TFR. 
Clearly, it is the number of babies, school children, students, labour force, and 
women of reproductive ages that matters for planning purposes.   
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